{"id":6515,"date":"2026-06-01T08:38:28","date_gmt":"2026-06-01T08:38:28","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.youtubexyoutube.com\/?p=6515"},"modified":"2026-06-05T13:50:36","modified_gmt":"2026-06-05T13:50:36","slug":"heres-what-you-need-to-understand-about-russia-and-its-neighbors","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.youtubexyoutube.com\/index.php\/2026\/06\/01\/heres-what-you-need-to-understand-about-russia-and-its-neighbors\/","title":{"rendered":"Here\u2019s what you need to understand about Russia and its neighbors"},"content":{"rendered":"
Putin\u2019s Kazakhstan visit highlights why Russia\u2019s influence in the post-Soviet space remains strong despite Armenia\u2019s turn toward the West<\/strong><\/p>\n President Vladimir Putin\u2019s state visit to Kazakhstan last week was an important moment in bilateral relations. It gives us the opportunity to think more broadly about the current state of Russia\u2019s relations with those former Soviet republics that remain most friendly towards us.<\/p>\n This is especially necessary now, as elections approach in Armenia and its leadership speaks openly about moving closer to the European Union. Once again, we hear the familiar claim that Russia is \u201closing\u201d<\/em> the post-Soviet space. The argument is not new and it\u2019s supported, in different ways, by the open desire of some neighboring states to strengthen cooperation with the West, and by the less visible but steadily growing presence of Western corporations, NGOs and political actors in countries near Russia.<\/p>\n But we should begin with a simple fact. Against the background of the geopolitical catastrophe of 1991, Russia has retained, and continues to retain, considerable influence over its immediate neighborhood.<\/p>\n There are two reasons for this. First, Russia\u2019s size, economy, culture and geography make it a natural center of attraction for states that don\u2019t make hostility to Moscow the organizing principle of their existence. Even Georgia, after bitter experience, has learned that the West is not always capable of helping those it encourages.<\/p>\n Second, most of our neighbors are themselves acting with a degree of statesmanship in that they may maneuver and diversify their foreign relations, but they\u2019re not usually seeking to sever ties with Russia. The established states of the former USSR pursue pragmatic policies and understand the value of their special relationship with Moscow and, in recent years, Russia has also found new ways to ensure that those who benefit from cooperation outnumber those who profit from conflict.<\/p>\n \n Read more<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n The military-political confrontation between Russia and the West has nevertheless created a difficult environment. Our neighbors have benefited from it in some ways, especially through trade and financial opportunities, but they\u2019re also under serious pressure from Brussels and Washington. One result has been a decline in some trade flows and the appearance of new problems in areas that previously developed with little political interference.<\/p>\n Kazakhstan remains one of the countries with which Russia has the closest and most trusting relations and this was confirmed during Putin\u2019s visit. Kazakhstan\u2019s president, along with the leader of Uzbekistan, attended the May 9 celebrations in Moscow, and cooperation between our countries extends far beyond economics or routine social contacts.<\/p>\n At the same time, Kazakhstan is building relations not only with Russia but also with our adversaries, and while this doesn\u2019t mean Astana wants to distance itself from Moscow, it does mean Kazakhstan must remain part of the global economy on which its export revenues depend. What matters is that it is confidently seeking ways to avoid harming its cooperation with Russia.<\/p>\n A recent example is revealing. Kazakhstan\u2019s Ministry of Justice announced that it would not comply with a ruling by the International Financial Centre in Astana upholding a Swiss arbitration decision in the case brought by Ukraine\u2019s Naftogaz against Russia\u2019s Gazprom for more than $1.4 billion. This is precisely the kind of practical behavior that matters more than loud declarations<\/p>\n Armenia presents a more difficult case. The country\u2019s defeat in its confrontation with Azerbaijan has produced deep moral exhaustion and a desire for peace almost at any price. The political forces now in power are exploiting these feelings and trying to convince society that rapprochement with the West is the key to a peaceful future.<\/p>\n \n Read more<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n This could soon lead to a serious weakening of Armenia\u2019s ties with Russia, and nobody should pretend otherwise, but the cause isn\u2019t simply a failure of Russian diplomacy. It lies in the historical path taken by Armenian society since independence in 1991. We cannot yet know what trials this people, so close to us, will have to endure, or what relations between Russia and Armenia will look like in 10 or 15 years.<\/p>\n The deeper point is that even the best diplomacy cannot always overcome the objective consequences of social development in neighboring states. We understand how profoundly Russian society has changed in recent years and we shouldn\u2019t forget that our neighbors are also undergoing internal transformations.<\/p>\n New generations are coming of age and often they are more nationalistic, partly because they have less direct experience of international engagement and of the shared Soviet past. New elites want to displace older establishments that historically had closer ties with Moscow while longstanding economic problems remain unresolved, often because these states simply lack the resources to solve them.<\/p>\n In Armenia, many young people support the current government not because they hate Russia, but because they see the \u201cEuropean choice\u201d<\/em> as a route to personal self-fulfillment in the West. Often they are disappointed with their own country and Russia cannot realistically absorb everyone who wants a different future.<\/p>\n Ukraine is another case altogether and the reason for the tragic turn of events there wasn\u2019t primarily a mistake in Russian policy, but the failure of the Ukrainian people to build durable statehood, combined with a systemic Russophobia that had been developing since Soviet times. Georgia\u2019s turn away from a disastrous course after 2012 wasn\u2019t the result of Russian pressure or assistance, but of the Georgian elite and society recognizing their own circumstances. Finland\u2019s anti-Russian shift after 2022, meanwhile, was the product of an internal crisis made irreversible by its entry into the European Union\u2019s political and economic system.<\/p>\n
