{"id":4585,"date":"2026-03-24T06:33:12","date_gmt":"2026-03-24T07:33:12","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.youtubexyoutube.com\/?p=4585"},"modified":"2026-03-30T17:21:02","modified_gmt":"2026-03-30T17:21:02","slug":"another-setback-for-kiev-ukraines-spring-push-stalls-amid-russian-gains","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.youtubexyoutube.com\/index.php\/2026\/03\/24\/another-setback-for-kiev-ukraines-spring-push-stalls-amid-russian-gains\/","title":{"rendered":"Another setback for Kiev: Ukraine\u2019s spring push stalls amid Russian gains"},"content":{"rendered":"
Claims of reclaimed territory have proven hollow as Russia consolidates positions from Sumy to Zaporozhye<\/strong><\/p>\n The Russian Army has considerably reduced its combat activity, as is usual at this time of year. Typically, at the end of winter and in early spring, Russian forces take the time to prepare for a new military campaign. However, just like last year, the offensive did not come to a complete stop.\u00a0<\/p>\n Let\u2019s take a look at what has happened at the front over the past two months, including the results of the much-publicized counteroffensive of the Ukrainian army in Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye Regions.<\/p>\n Russia\u2019s North Group of Forces began establishing a buffer zone in Ukraine\u2019s Sumy Region a year ago, following the liberation of Russia\u2019s Kursk Region and the town of Sudzha. Initially, the transfer of hostilities to Ukrainian territory triggered a sort of panic in the\u00a0Ukrainian army \u2013 as it turned out, except for the units that fled Sudzha, there were almost no Ukrainian forces in the area. Rumors circulated that the Russian army was about to advance towards Sumy.<\/p>\n However, the Russian Army\u2019s actions did not go beyond officially stated objectives: To create a buffer zone that would ensure the security of Russia\u2019s border areas. Overall, this objective has been achieved \u2013 Sudzha is now a much safer place than Belgorod, for example.\u00a0<\/p>\n At the end of last year, the North Group of Forces opened a new front in Sumy Region by capturing the small border village of Grabovskoye. Since then, the foothold has been expanded: Russian troops captured the large village of Pokrovka and a considerable area to the north near the village of Miropolye. This established a certain buffer zone between Ukraine\u2019s Sumy Region and Russia\u2019s Kursk and Belgorod Regions. In the future, it will also prevent any offensive actions against Rakitnoe (the Ukrainian army attempted to break through to Rakitnoe during the 2024 advance on Sudzha).<\/p>\n Seversk (captured on December 11) was an important but intermediate stop on the way to the key area in Donbass \u2013 the Slaviansk-Kramatorsk urban conglomeration. The South Group of Forces needs to cover 25-30 km to reach Slaviansk-Kramatorsk, while overcoming a significant elevation along the way. A portion of this route has already been traversed, with Russian troops managing to close in and engage in fierce battles for the primary Ukrainian defense line in this direction.<\/p>\n To the south, a second offensive is underway along the M-03 highway. Several settlements have been captured here, including an important stronghold in Fyodorovka Vtoraya.\u00a0<\/p>\n In summary, over the past two months, the Russian Army has advanced up to 12 km along a 25-km front line. There has effectively been no operational pause in the Seversk direction.\u00a0<\/p>\n To the south, battles have continued for the strategically important city of Konstantinovka (pre-war population: 78,000), which is effectively part of the Slaviansk-Kramatorsk urban conglomeration. This direction is particularly challenging: The Russian Army must traverse nearly 50 km of urban terrain to reach Slaviansk, and 25 km to approach Kramatorsk.<\/p>\n Fighters from the South Group of Forces have captured the southern part of Konstantinovka and are engaged in combat near the train station. Next up are battles for control over the Konstantinovka Metallurgical Plant and the nearby lead factory, as well as the multi-storey buildings in the western section of the city. In fact, the city may be captured without resorting to street battles, using the now-classic Russian strategy that involves semi-encirclement and establishing fire control over supply lines.\u00a0<\/p>\n However, the extensive urban development could thwart this plan. Konstantinovka can be supplied from nearby Druzhkovka via at least six different routes. This means that, similar to the strategies employed in neighboring Pokrovsk and Mirnograd, it may be necessary to physically sever one city from another or to encircle both simultaneously. This will be one of the goals of the upcoming military campaign.<\/p>\n In our last frontline report, we speculated on the direction the Russian Army might take after capturing Pokrovsk and Mirnograd: Would it head north toward Slaviansk-Kramatorsk or west toward the border of the Donetsk People\u2019s Republic and Dnepropetrovsk Region?<\/p>\n In the past two months, troops from the Center Group of Forces have been active along the entire perimeter of their front; they captured Sofievka, Shakhovo, and Novy Donbass, expanded their zone of control around the city of Rodninskoye, and captured the important settlement of Grishino west of Pokrovsk.<\/p>\n At first glance, it appears that the Center Group of Forces has opted to advance in both directions simultaneously. However, the real aim may be to prevent the enemy from establishing new defensive positions after losing control over Pokrovsk and Mirnograd. As is often the case, the front line here is not continuous; there\u2019s a wide gray zone. By applying continuous pressure and squeezing the gray zone, Russian troops aim to prevent the Ukrainian army from establishing defensive positions and adequately reinforcing its segment of the front, particularly with FPV drone pilots.\u00a0<\/p>\n The Orekhov-Zaporozhye direction has been the most active section of the front in the past two months. In our previous overview, we suggested that the Russian Army would launch a major offensive in this area, focusing on surrounding the strategically important city of Orekhov and advancing towards Zaporozhye, the capital of Zaporozhye Region and one of the largest industrial centers in former Ukraine.<\/p>\n It seems that the Ukrainian General Staff shares this view. In 2026, the Ukrainian army initiated its first series of counterattacks precisely in this direction. Ukrainian and Western media portrayed these counterattacks almost as a new strategic offensive. Throughout February, the media published reports of \u2018liberated\u2019 settlements and hundreds of square kilometers of reclaimed territory.<\/p>\n However, the Ukrainian side has not provided any verified evidence to support these claims. There are no authenticated photos or videos showing Ukraine controlling these areas, and the actual evidence amounts to Ukrainian flags dropped from drones. In short, the effect has been the opposite: The operation has been called the first offensive ever to unfold entirely on X.\u00a0<\/p>\nSumy region: Expanding the buffer zone<\/h2>\n

\n \u00a9\u00a0RT \/ Sergey Poletaev based on data from Lostarmor.Ru <\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\nSeversk: On the way to Slaviansk-Kramatorsk<\/h2>\n

\n \u00a9\u00a0RT \/ Sergey Poletaev based on data from Lostarmor.Ru <\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\nKonstantinovka: Also en route to Slaviansk-Kramatorsk<\/h2>\n

\n \u00a9\u00a0RT \/ Sergey Poletaev based on data from Lostarmor.Ru <\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\nPokrovsk-Mirnograd: securing the perimeter<\/h2>\n

\n \u00a9\u00a0RT \/ Sergey Poletaev based on data from Lostarmor.Ru <\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\nZaporozhye direction: Ukraine\u2019s supposed counteroffensive\u00a0<\/h2>\n