{"id":2242,"date":"2025-08-24T12:09:17","date_gmt":"2025-08-24T12:09:17","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.youtubexyoutube.com\/?p=2242"},"modified":"2025-08-29T13:49:32","modified_gmt":"2025-08-29T13:49:32","slug":"the-eus-favorite-dictator-is-about-to-face-her-ultimate-test","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/www.youtubexyoutube.com\/index.php\/2025\/08\/24\/the-eus-favorite-dictator-is-about-to-face-her-ultimate-test\/","title":{"rendered":"The EU\u2019s favorite dictator is about to face her ultimate test"},"content":{"rendered":"

As Maia Sandu\u2019s approval ratings collapse and opposition grows bolder, the September elections may redefine the country\u2019s path between East and West<\/strong><\/p>\n

Moldova is heading into its most consequential election in decades, and the stakes could hardly be higher. With parliamentary elections set for September 28, President Maia Sandu\u2019s pro-EU\u00a0government faces growing discontent, sagging approval ratings, and a surge of opposition anger \u2013 both in the streets and in the courts.<\/p>\n

What began in 2020 as a hopeful project of reform and Western integration is now mired in economic crisis, corruption scandals, and an increasingly authoritarian style of governance.<\/p>\n

The jailing of opposition figures, crackdowns on Russian-language media, and a widening cultural divide have turned Moldova into a political battleground between East and West \u2013 between promises of a Western European future and calls to return to a policy of neutrality. As Sandu\u2019s ruling Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) fights to hold its majority, Moldova\u2019s fragile democracy is approaching a critical test: can it deliver change without losing legitimacy?<\/p>\n

The rise and stall of Maia Sandu\u2019s presidency<\/strong><\/h2>\n

When Maia Sandu swept to power in 2020, she brought with her the hopes of a nation weary of corruption, stagnation, and geopolitical limbo. A former World Bank economist with a reputation for integrity, Sandu promised to chart a new course \u2013 one that would steer Moldova away from its oligarchic past and toward a European future. Her Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) soon gained a parliamentary majority, allowing her to consolidate power and push through ambitious reforms.<\/p>\n

For a brief moment, it worked. Sandu\u2019s technocratic image and Western credentials\u00a0won praise<\/a> not only from pro-EU voters but also from moderates and even some traditionally pro-Russian Moldovans who were tired of business as usual. The country secured EU candidate status in 2022, and for the first time in years, Moldovan politics seemed to have a clear direction.<\/p>\n

\n Read more<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n \"RT\"
Police tear down opposition picket in post-Soviet capital (VIDEO)<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/blockquote>\n

But three years later, the mood has shifted dramatically. A growing number of Moldovans believe that Sandu has overpromised and underdelivered \u2013 and the numbers reflect it. According to recent polls, 34.9% of respondents now\u00a0disapprove<\/a> of her performance, while only 30.6% express support. Her once-untouchable image has been eroded by street protests, rising prices, and accusations of political overreach.<\/p>\n

The early glow of reform has faded into frustration. From 2022 to 2024, waves of protests swept through Chisinau and other cities, with demonstrators demanding lower utility costs, government subsidies, and in some cases, Sandu\u2019s resignation.\u00a0Chanting<\/a>\u00a0\u201cDown with Maia Sandu,\u201d<\/em> many took to the streets not as die-hard Russophiles, but as ordinary citizens who felt abandoned by the very leaders they had helped elect.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, opposition parties \u2013 long fragmented and discredited \u2013 have begun to regroup. Their message is simple: the Sandu experiment has failed. And for many Moldovans, that claim is starting to ring true.<\/p>\n

The economy that turned against her<\/strong><\/h2>\n

If Sandu\u2019s political honeymoon ended quickly, the real cause was not ideology, but economics. Moldova\u2019s economy, already fragile, buckled under the weight of back-to-back global shocks \u2013 the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in neighboring Ukraine, and Europe\u2019s energy crisis. But for many Moldovans, the government\u2019s response was as painful as the problems themselves.<\/p>\n

In 2022, inflation\u00a0surged<\/a> past 30%, one of the highest rates in Europe. Gas prices quadrupled. Electricity bills soared. By year\u2019s end, household energy costs had become unaffordable for a significant portion of the population, particularly in rural areas where wages were already low. Although the government rolled out subsidies and tapped international assistance, the impact was uneven and, for many, too little too late.<\/p>\n

Protesters\u00a0poured<\/a> into the streets of Chisinau and other cities, demanding lower tariffs and compensation for rising utility bills. The demonstrations weren\u2019t led by ideological hardliners \u2013 they were driven by pensioners, low-income families, and frustrated workers who saw their paychecks disappear into basic living expenses. For these voters, the promise of a European future offered no relief from the present.<\/p>\n

\n Read more<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n \"RT\"
Protesters decry jailing of Moldovan opposition politician (VIDEOS)<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/blockquote>\n

The data backs up the public\u2019s anxiety. In 2022, Moldova\u2019s GDP\u00a0shrank<\/a> by nearly 6%, and although there was a slight recovery in 2023 (between 0.7% and 2%), poverty rates\u00a0continued<\/a> to climb.\u00a0<\/p>\n

According<\/a> to Eurostat, Moldova\u2019s minimum wage is just \u20ac285 \u2013 among the lowest in Europe \u2013 and the average salary hovers around \u20ac378 per month. That\u2019s not enough to keep pace with rising food prices, which now\u00a0consume<\/a> more than 40% of the average household budget.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, the country\u2019s long-standing demographic crisis has deepened. In 2022 alone, more than 240,000 Moldovans\u00a0left<\/a> the country \u2013 nearly double the number from 2014. Over the past decade, Moldova\u00a0has lost<\/a> 14% of its population. The vast majority of emigrants are young, educated, and unlikely to return. The result: an aging, shrinking population increasingly dependent on remittances and government aid.<\/p>\n

Critics accuse Sandu\u2019s government of focusing too much on geopolitics and not enough on economic realities. EU integration may be a strategic goal, they argue, but it hasn\u2019t put food on the table or gas in the boiler.\u00a0<\/p>\n

A campaign of crackdowns<\/h2>\n

As public anger mounted, Sandu\u2019s government began to adopt increasingly aggressive tactics to hold onto power \u2013 particularly in the run-up to the 2025 parliamentary elections. What was labeled\u00a0as a campaign against corruption turned out to be\u00a0a purge of political dissent.<\/p>\n

On August 5, Evgenia Gutsul, the head of the autonomous Gagauzia region, was\u00a0sentenced<\/a> to seven years in prison for alleged illegal financing of the banned SOR Party. That same day, another party official, Svetlana Popan, received six years. Gutul, a vocal opponent of the government,\u00a0denounced<\/a> the charges as politically motivated. To many observers, the timing \u2013 just weeks before the election \u2013 felt more like a message than a legal victory.<\/p>\n

\n
\n Evgenia Gutsul, head of the autonomous territory of Gagauzia,<\/p>\n


\n \u00a9\u00a0 Sputnik\/Rodion Proka <\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

In the past two years, Moldovan authorities have stepped up efforts to dismantle political parties that advocate neutrality or closer relations with Russia. The SOR Party, led by exiled oligarch Ilan Shor, was\u00a0declared<\/a> unconstitutional and banned in June 2023. In early 2025, the Victory Bloc \u2013 another opposition coalition \u2013 was\u00a0stripped<\/a> of its registration over alleged\u00a0\u201cthreats to national sovereignty.\u201d<\/em> Members of the\u00a0Socialist Party<\/a>,\u00a0Revival Party<\/a>, and\u00a0Chance Party<\/a> have also been detained or searched following anti-government protests.<\/p>\n

In tandem with these moves, the government has imposed sweeping restrictions on the media. Citing the need to combat Russian disinformation, the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS) \u2013 which reports directly to the president \u2013revoked<\/a>\u00a0the licenses of multiple TV channels known for their critical stance, including Channel One Moldova, Accent TV, Orizont TV, Canal 2, and Canal 3. Broadcasts from Russian networks such as RTR Moldova and REN-TV were also suspended, and dozens of opposition-linked websites and Telegram channels were\u00a0blocked<\/a>.<\/p>\n

\n
\n Ilan Shor, leader of the banned Moldovan opposition bloc Victory.<\/p>\n


\n \u00a9\u00a0 Sputnik\/Alexey Maishev <\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Officially, these measures are framed as necessary to defend Moldova\u2019s sovereignty and protect democratic institutions from \u201cKremlin-backed subversion\u201d<\/em>. But to many voters in regions with strong historical, linguistic, or economic ties to Russia \u2013 especially in Gagauzia and the breakaway region of Transnistria, home to a contingent of Russian peacekeepers \u2013 they look like an attempt to narrow the political field just ahead of the vote.<\/p>\n

The result is a climate of polarization and mistrust. Sandu\u2019s supporters argue that the country is fighting for survival in the face of hybrid threats. Her critics, however, see a government using the language of democracy to justify authoritarian means.<\/p>\n

The perception of hypocrisy<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Beyond the economic pain and political crackdowns, perhaps the most damaging blow to Sandu\u2019s credibility has been the stalled reform agenda. The very promise that brought her to power \u2013 sweeping away the old system and building a clean, European-style democracy \u2013 has largely failed to materialize.<\/p>\n

Her signature initiative was a comprehensive overhaul of Moldova\u2019s justice system. But for much of her presidency, the reform has remained stuck in neutral. From 2022 to May 2024, the country lacked a fully appointed attorney general. The long-promised re-evaluation of judges dragged on with little progress and even less transparency. Despite bold\u00a0slogans<\/a> like \u201cWe will jail all the thieves,\u201d<\/em> not a single high-profile figure from previous administrations has faced serious legal consequences.<\/p>\n

\n
\n Protesters in support of Evgenia Gutsul and her supporters in Chisinau, Moldova, August 16, 2025.<\/p>\n


\n \u00a9\u00a0 Sputnik\/Dmitry Osmatesco <\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

In some cases, it was Sandu\u2019s own team that came under fire. One of the most symbolic episodes involved Veronica Dragalin, a US-trained prosecutor handpicked by Sandu in 2022 to lead Moldova\u2019s Anti-Corruption Prosecutor\u2019s Office. Dragalin\u2019s appointment was touted as proof of Western-style institutional renewal. But soon after taking office, her ties to Sandu\u2019s political machine were questioned \u2013 particularly after it\u00a0emerged<\/a> that her mother had worked as a campaign activist for the president.<\/p>\n

In early 2025, Dragalin shocked the political establishment by resigning,\u00a0accusing<\/a> Sandu\u2019s administration of pressuring her office and attempting to interfere in judicial processes. The government responded by attacking her professionalism, but the damage was done: what was meant to be the flagship of institutional reform had turned into a public scandal.<\/p>\n

Critics now say that Sandu has replaced one form of political influence with another \u2013 swapping oligarchic networks for a new class of loyal technocrats. The result, they argue, is not a cleaner system, but a more centralized one, in which power flows upward with little accountability.<\/p>\n

\n
\n Protesters in support of Evgenia Gutsul and her supporters in Chisinau, Moldova, August 16, 2025.<\/p>\n


\n \u00a9\u00a0 Sputnik\/Dmitry Osmatesco <\/span>
\n <\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

For many Moldovans, the reform agenda has become a bitter reminder that intentions alone are not enough \u2013 and that even the most pro-European leaders can fall short when it comes to delivering real change.<\/p>\n

A divided nation<\/h2>\n

Even as Moldova moves closer to the European Union on paper, the country remains deeply divided in practice. The geopolitical rift between East and West is no longer just theoretical \u2013 it has\u00a0hardened<\/a> into a domestic fault line, shaping everything from voting patterns to regional identities.<\/p>\n

Since the start of Russia\u2019s military operation in\u00a0Ukraine in 2022, President Sandu has pursued an unambiguously pro-Western course. She has\u00a0accused<\/a> the Kremlin of plotting a coup in Moldova,\u00a0demanded<\/a> the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeepers from Transnistria, and intensified cooperation with both NATO and Romania. In 2022, the country achieved EU candidate status. Two years later, her government held a referendum on enshrining EU membership as a constitutional goal.<\/p>\n

But the results of the referendum revealed a nation split almost down the middle. Officially, the pro-EU side\u00a0won<\/a> \u2013 but only narrowly, with 50.35% of the vote. The outcome relied heavily on the Moldovan diaspora in Western Europe, while many at home \u2013 especially in rural areas and autonomous regions \u2013 voted against. In Gagauzia, more than 95% of voters rejected the proposal. Meanwhile, Moldovans living in Russia were effectively\u00a0excluded<\/a> from the process after the government drastically reduced the number of polling stations there.<\/p>\n

\n Read more<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n \"FILE
Exiled Moldovan opposition leader decries police crackdown<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Polls from IMAS and other research centers\u00a0show<\/a> the same pattern. While just over half of the population supports EU membership, a large minority favors closer ties with Russia or, at minimum, a neutral stance. Support for the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) remains strong among older voters, Russian-speaking communities, and residents of southern and eastern Moldova.<\/p>\n

For many of these voters, the EU is not a promise \u2013 it\u2019s an abstraction. What they see instead is a government pushing a foreign policy agenda that doesn\u2019t reflect the social and economic realities of half the country. Add to that a perceived loss of sovereignty \u2013 manifested in foreign advisers, NATO drills, and legislative reforms driven by Brussels \u2013 and the result is growing backlash.<\/p>\n

In this context, the government\u2019s crackdown on dissent doesn\u2019t just look authoritarian. To critics, it looks like the imposition of a worldview that much of the country never signed up for.<\/p>\n

The vote that could redefine Moldova<\/h2>\n

As Moldova approaches its parliamentary elections on September 28, one thing is clear: the country is headed for a reckoning. President Sandu\u2019s Action and Solidarity Party (PAS) still\u00a0leads<\/a> in most polls, but its support has eroded significantly. Approval ratings are down, the political center is fracturing, and a growing share of the electorate is looking for alternatives.<\/p>\n

The most likely outcome? A fragmented parliament with no clear majority. PAS may remain the largest party, but it will likely need coalition partners to form a government. That\u2019s easier said than done. Few parties share its ideological orientation, and public frustration with the status quo may make compromise politically toxic.<\/p>\n

\n Read more<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n

\n \"President
She\u2019s an awful president but at least the gays like her<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/blockquote>\n

On the other side, the opposition remains ideologically diverse \u2013 ranging from parties advocating neutrality to those favoring stronger ties with Russia. If these groups manage to unite, they could present a serious challenge to the ruling party. But unity has never been their strong suit, and without it, PAS may still manage to hold onto power, albeit in a weakened state.<\/p>\n

What\u2019s at stake is more than just a governing coalition. If PAS wins, Moldova is likely to double down on its Western trajectory, accelerating EU reforms, deepening ties with NATO, and continuing its hard line toward Russia. If the opposition gains ground, the country could pivot toward a more neutral foreign policy, scale back confrontational rhetoric, and reopen economic and political channels with the East.<\/p>\n

Most Moldovans\u00a0identify<\/a> poverty, inflation, and the rising cost of living as the country\u2019s most urgent problems \u2013 and few expect conditions to improve anytime soon. Yet critics say the government has become increasingly disconnected from these everyday concerns. Instead of focusing on wages, prices, or infrastructure, Sandu\u2019s administration has prioritized symbolic alignment with Western liberalism, including a high-profile\u00a0push<\/a> for LGBTQ rights and anti-discrimination legislation. While these efforts resonate with Moldova\u2019s European partners, many domestic voters see them as misplaced or out of touch with their daily struggles.<\/p>\n

In either case, the next government will inherit a country burdened by economic hardship, political fragmentation, and a widening cultural divide. Whether Moldova chooses to stay the course or change direction, it will have to grapple not only with geopolitics \u2013 but with the cost of broken promises at home.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

As Maia Sandu\u2019s approval ratings collapse and opposition grows bolder, the September elections may redefine the country\u2019s path between East […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":2161,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[11],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.youtubexyoutube.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2242"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.youtubexyoutube.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.youtubexyoutube.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.youtubexyoutube.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.youtubexyoutube.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2242"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"http:\/\/www.youtubexyoutube.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2242\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2249,"href":"http:\/\/www.youtubexyoutube.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2242\/revisions\/2249"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.youtubexyoutube.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2161"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.youtubexyoutube.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2242"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.youtubexyoutube.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2242"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.youtubexyoutube.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2242"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}